Key Highlights:
- Sky Protocol’s opt-in stUSDS pool has reached 100% utilization, preventing lender withdrawals while vault liquidations remain halted in contract code.
- A multi-signature Safe holding the rune.eth address accounts for 77.1 million USDS of the 161 million USDS total debt against 3.58 billion staked $SKY collateral.
- Co-founder Rune Christensen affirmed that the core protocol remains fully functional and overcollateralized, even as USDS circulation declined by 37% and borrow rates climb toward 50%.
Staked USDS Liquidity Lockup and the Rune.eth Vaults
Onchain data from Sky Protocol reveals significant liquidity constraints within its separate, opt-in stUSDS module, leaving depositors unable to execute direct withdrawals. In the stUSDS structure, users deposit USDS to supply liquidity for borrowers pledging staked $SKY, earning yield based on pool utilization. The pool is designed to target 90% utilization, with protocol documentation warning that liquidity constraints can arise during peak demand. Outstanding debt across the underlying LSEV2-$SKY-A vault type currently totals 161 million USDS, with 77.1 million USDS concentrated in four vaults controlled by a three-of-five Safe multisig that holds the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) address rune.eth. These four vaults hold 3.58 billion $SKY in collateral, representing 15% of the total circulating supply of $SKY and 21% of all $SKY staked within the protocol.
Market scrutiny around the pool intensified after onchain monitors tracked the lack of turnover in the borrowing positions. The X account @punkquidity, which initially highlighted the pool on Nov. 14, observed on Thursday that borrowers had repaid roughly 420,000 USDS over a 10-day span and noted that “liquidations on these loans are off.”
Similarly, the account @kirbyongeo pointed out on Wednesday that “there is 0 liquidity for any USDS lenders to withdraw.”
Both assessments align directly with current contract states. While research firm Oak Research linked the rune.eth address to Sky co-founder Rune Christensen, the Safe’s ENS record contains no entries directly establishing Christensen’s legal identity.
Oracle Caps and Stalled Liquidation Mechanics
The solvency metrics of the LSEV2-$SKY-A vaults depend heavily on the pricing mechanics utilized by the protocol. Sky does not rely on spot market pricing; instead, collateral valuations are determined by a specialized contract called LockstakeCappedOsmWrapper. This contract is programmed to return whichever value is lower: the active oracle price or an administrative cap set by governance. That cap currently stands at 2.5 cents per $SKY. By comparison, the uncapped oracle reading sits roughly 38% higher, while $SKY’s spot market price trades approximately 48% above the 2.5-cent threshold.
The active settings stem from a November 2025 governance forum proposal submitted by Christensen, which lowered the liquidation ratio for the vault type to 120% and set the sticky oracle max price to 2.5 cents. The proposal’s declared goal was to prevent automated liquidations on accounts hovering near insolvency thresholds, stating that liquidation for five smaller positions would only occur if $SKY dropped below 3 cents. The parameter change also included a stipulation that the liquidation ratio must return to 145% before the pricing cap can be adjusted upward. Because the 2.5-cent cap remains active, collateral value stays static while interest compounds continuously. At the capped valuation, the rune.eth collateral is valued at 89.5 million USDS against 77.1 million USDS of debt, pushing three of the four vaults to between 104% and 105% of the permitted 83% loan-to-value limit. Conversely, at spot market prices, the collateral is worth roughly 173 million USDS, yielding a combined loan-to-value ratio of 45%.
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On Thursday, Sky Forum participant BlockPinned reported that at the capped oracle figure, 12 out of 39 active borrowing positions—comprising 44% of the vault type’s loan book—are currently underwater relative to their required collateralization levels. However, the liquidation contract currently returns a stopped value of 3. In codebases inherited from MakerDAO, this specific setting deactivates the functions required to initiate, restart, or settle collateral auctions. Consequently, liquidations cannot proceed without direct governance intervention.
Interest Rate Adjustments and Secondary Market Exit Costs
With collateral auctions disabled, protocol risk managers have relied on automated interest rate adjustments to incentivize debt repayment. On Nov. 18, Core Council Risk Advisor BA Labs recommended increasing the time drift speed parameter from 0.17 to 0.45 to accelerate rate increases while pool utilization remains at 100%. Soter Labs, acting as Core GovOps, executed the modification the same day under existing governance delegation.
The adjustment places the pool on a published trajectory toward a maximum borrow rate of 50%, stepping up by up to five percentage points per update. By Thursday, following two updates, the borrow and depositor rates both stood near 25%. While higher rates accrue to depositors on paper, funds remain locked until borrowers pay down principal or fresh deposits enter the module.
Lenders seeking immediate liquidity have turned to decentralized secondary markets, primarily the USDS/stUSDS liquidity pool on Curve. That pool held roughly 116,000 USDS against 1.86 million stUSDS on Thursday, resulting in steep slippage. A trade of stUSDS valued at 1,000 USDS at net asset value incurred an 8.1% discount, while a swap of 100,000 USDS realized a 21% discount, highlighting the limited exit capacity outside the protocol.
Core Protocol Stability, Buybacks, and Industry Reaction
Addressing community concerns, Christensen stated publicly on Thursday that “Sky Protocol is operating normally,”
affirming that the broader USDS stablecoin maintains overcollateralization backed by approximately 10 billion in assets. Christensen clarified that stUSDS is a segregated, opt-in facility designed as junior risk capital that does not provide balance-sheet backing for core USDS or sUSDS holdings. Despite these assurances, the protocol experienced substantial capital movement, with circulating USDS dropping 37% from 5.24 billion to 3.28 billion within 24 hours, and Sky Lending’s total value locked declining from 3.6 billion to roughly two billion.
To support market confidence, Sky initiated a temporary buyback acceleration on Thursday under Core Council direction, deploying 750,000 USDS daily over seven days via the Smart Burn Engine’s SBE-BEAM module. Meanwhile, industry figures offered differing views on the setup. Marc Zeller, founder of the Aave Chan Initiative, stated on Thursday that “stUSDS is Rune private credit line to fund his pet projects,”
while confirming that his organization’s treasury continues to earn yield through Sky without plans to withdraw.
Some market commentary has attempted to connect the borrowing activity to Raw Power Games ApS, a gaming studio founded by Christensen that entered liquidation on Oct. 29. However, onchain transaction trails show that borrowed USDS departed the vaults via standard transfers, with no public data linking the funds to the insolvent game studio.
Why This Matters
The situation in the stUSDS pool highlights the friction that can occur between decentralized risk isolation and protocol-level governance settings. While Sky Protocol engineered stUSDS to isolate speculative staking risk from its primary stablecoin, the combination of halted liquidation functions, fixed oracle caps, and concentrated debt positions has locked depositor capital despite theoretical solvency on open markets. Resolving the gridlock will require specific actions: either voluntary loan repayments, governance votes to re-enable liquidation auctions, or updates to the sticky oracle price cap alongside collateral ratio revisions.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is standard USDS at risk from the stUSDS liquidity crunch?
According to protocol documentation and leadership, stUSDS is an isolated, opt-in risk module. Core USDS and sUSDS reserves do not rely on stUSDS collateral, and USDS remains backed by separate collateral reserves exceeding outstanding debt.
Why are depositors currently unable to withdraw from stUSDS?
The stUSDS pool is operating at 100% utilization. Under protocol rules, lenders can only withdraw their underlying USDS when outstanding loans are repaid by borrowers or when new capital is deposited into the pool.
Why hasn’t the protocol liquidated the underwater vaults?
The liquidation smart contract for the LSEV2-$SKY-A vault type has a stopped parameter set to 3, which intentionally disables auction mechanisms. These vaults cannot be liquidated until Sky governance submits and executes a parameter update to reactivate auctions.




