Key Highlights:
- Research by Inca revealed that North Korean state-backed cybercriminals routed stolen assets through Sky’s Peg Stability Module (PSM) to convert blacklisted or freezable tokens.
- Exploiting the mechanism, hackers swapped freezable USD Coin (USDC) into non-freezable stablecoins USDS and DAI, laundering funds tied to the 2025 Bybit hack of up to $1.5 billion.
- While the protocol functioned as designed without code exploits, the activity highlights growing regulatory dilemmas for decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms balancing permissionless architecture with institutional compliance.
North Korean Hackers Exploit DeFi Arbitrage Plumbing to Evade Asset Freezes
State-sponsored cybercriminals tied to North Korea have leveraged decentralized finance infrastructure to bypass law enforcement and issuer controls, according to research findings by Inca. Analysts discovered that illicit actors utilized Sky’s Peg Stability Module (PSM)—a foundational liquidity mechanism formerly known under the MakerDAO brand—to trade easily frozen stablecoins for censorship-resistant alternatives without paying fees or experiencing slippage.
The operational vulnerability stems from the stark contrast in token design on either side of the module. While USD Coin ($USDC) features a smart-contract freeze function enabling issuer Circle to lock assets sitting in flagged wallets, decentralized counterparts USDS and $DAI possess no such centralized off switch. By swapping hot funds through the PSM, illicit actors effectively converted traceable, lockable capital into decentralized stable assets that cannot be frozen by any corporate issuer or regulatory mandate.
Tracing the Stolen Funds from the Bybit Breach
According to Inca’s findings, several North Korean-linked wallets that accessed the PSM were initially funded by assets seized during the massive 2025 hack of cryptocurrency exchange Bybit. The Bybit breach, attributed by investigators to North Korean threat groups, led to the loss of approximately $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion in digital assets, remaining among the largest crypto heists in the history of the digital asset industry.
In total, Inca flagged $518 million in transactions interacting through the protocol, with at least $9 million traced directly to North Korean state-sponsored actors. These flows coincide with broader trends tracked across the sector, where North Korean cyber groups were linked to cumulative theft volumes surpassing $2 billion across multiple exchange attacks in 2025 alone. Rather than risking asset seizures by holding $USDC across centralized services, cybercriminals have adopted increasingly sophisticated DeFi maneuvers to safeguard their illicit yields.
Permissionless Infrastructure Under Institutional Scrutiny
The transactions did not occur due to a smart contract vulnerability, protocol exploit, or drained reserves. The PSM was originally engineered by MakerDAO—prior to its rebrand as Sky and the rollout of its USDS stablecoin alongside legacy $DAI—to preserve the tokens’ $1 peg by allowing users and arbitrageurs to trade collateral seamlessly at parity. In this case, the module performed exactly as coded.
However, because the module operates completely without permissioned access controls, it remains open to any entity on-chain, including sanctioned cyber syndicates. This open architecture complicates Sky’s broader strategic positioning. The protocol has marketed USDS and $DAI to native DeFi participants on the strength of decentralization and resistance to censorship, while simultaneously courting institutional partners on promises of safety, liquidity, and regulatory alignment. In early October 2026, the PSM held over $4.4 billion in liquidity, while Sky’s stablecoin market capitalization stood at roughly $6 billion within an ecosystem valued at more than $9 billion.
Why This Matters
The reliance on decentralized liquidity pools to circumvent issuer blacklists exposes a critical friction point between centralized stablecoin issuers and decentralized protocols. Circle’s ability to freeze $USDC is an essential compliance mechanism for institutional adoption and legal compliance, but that safety mechanism is neutralized if illicit actors can swap into unfreezable assets before Circle can identify and blacklist the offending wallet addresses.
As research highlights the use of large-scale conversion tools by sanctioned groups, decentralized protocols face escalating scrutiny from global regulators. Observers indicate that market participants may need to reassess risk exposures to protocols facilitating unconstrained stable asset conversions, as potential regulatory mandates could enforce stricter compliance, modify institutional capital flows, and alter how decentralized protocols interact with fiat-backed tokens.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did North Korean hackers exploit a bug in Sky’s Peg Stability Module?
No. The research confirms that the Peg Stability Module was neither hacked nor drained. The system operated exactly as it was programmed to do: enabling zero-slippage, fee-free swaps at parity to maintain stablecoin peg stability. The challenge lies in its permissionless design, which permits any on-chain wallet to execute trades regardless of sanctions or token provenance.
Why did the hackers swap USDC for USDS and DAI?
USDC contains a built-in freeze mechanism managed by its centralized issuer, Circle, which allows specific wallet balances to be immobilized following illicit events or law enforcement requests. In contrast, USDS and DAI lack a centralized freeze function. Swapping into these decentralized tokens permanently prevents the funds from being frozen on-chain.
How much capital was linked to the Bybit hack and North Korea in this activity?
The 2025 Bybit hack resulted in an estimated $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion in stolen digital assets. Inca flagged a total of $518 million flowing through the PSM under review, with $9 million directly tied back to North Korean-linked wallets funded by the Bybit theft.




