Key Highlights
- About 1.7 million BTC are held in older P2PK addresses whose public keys are visible on the blockchain.
- BIP-360 and BIP-361 propose changes aimed at quantum-resistant signatures, but both remain drafts with no activation timeline as of November 2026.
- StarkWare and Blockstream have reported quantum-resistance work, while exchanges and custodians would also need to prepare for any transition.
Why Some Bitcoin Is More Exposed to Quantum Risk
Bitcoin relies on elliptic-curve cryptography using the secp256k1 curve to secure ownership. Today’s computers cannot practically derive a private key from its corresponding public key. But a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, reverse that process. If it did, an attacker who recovered a private key could take control of the associated funds.
Bitcoin addresses do not all have the same level of exposure. Older Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) addresses place the public key directly on the blockchain. Approximately 1.7 million BTC are held in these structurally vulnerable addresses. Reusing an address can also expose a public key: when someone repeatedly sends and receives funds through the same address, the key may become visible on-chain. That means the amount potentially exposed extends beyond the P2PK holdings alone.
The threat remains theoretical for now. No practical quantum computer capable of breaking Bitcoin’s signatures exists today, and the network has not adopted a quantum-resistant upgrade.
Bitcoin Quantum-Resistance Proposals Remain Unresolved
BIP-360 and BIP-361 propose new signature schemes and a phased transition away from legacy signatures. As of November 2026, both proposals remain in draft status, with no activation timeline.
The debate is not only technical. One camp supports restricting coins that are not moved to quantum-resistant addresses; another argues that any upgrade should remain voluntary. Neither approach has been adopted.
A restriction could reduce the risk of a sudden influx of stolen BTC if vulnerable keys were cracked. But it would also leave the protocol deciding what happens to coins whose owners did not migrate them, raising concerns about control over funds in a system designed to prevent others from accessing them.
A voluntary transition would avoid that intervention, but coins left in vulnerable addresses would remain exposed. If their keys were ever cracked, attackers could take the funds. Dormant holdings from Bitcoin’s early years are a particular concern because they are more likely to remain in older address formats.
Testing, Regulators and the Cost of a Transition
Engineering work is underway. StarkWare carried out what it described as the first quantum-safe Bitcoin transaction on mainnet in August 2026, while Blockstream has been testing post-quantum signatures.
Regulators are also examining the issue. IOSCO’s November 2026 report highlighted the complexity of upgrading Bitcoin’s cryptography. Regulatory reports have also pointed to challenges from larger signature sizes and the possibility of network congestion during a transition.
Post-quantum signatures tend to be larger than Bitcoin’s current signatures, so they take up more block space. If millions of coins were migrated at once, the resulting transactions could put additional pressure on the network. Some other blockchains have already begun rolling out quantum-resistant security, while Bitcoin, the largest and most conservative network in crypto, continues to debate its approach.
What Bitcoin Holders, Exchanges and Custodians Should Watch
The transition would involve more than changing Bitcoin’s protocol. Exchanges, custodians and bridges manage large amounts of BTC for users and would need to update wallets, signing systems and internal processes. Those changes would need to support deposits and withdrawals without disruption.
Institutional custodians may also face questions from clients and regulators about their readiness, particularly after IOSCO highlighted the complexity of a cryptographic upgrade. Key developments to watch include whether BIP-360 or BIP-361 advances beyond draft, whether developers reach agreement on dormant coins, and whether StarkWare and Blockstream extend their testing into broader production use.
Why This Matters
Bitcoin’s quantum-risk debate combines a future cryptographic threat with immediate questions about governance, network capacity and the security of funds held in older address formats. The network has no confirmed activation schedule for the draft proposals, and no practical quantum computer can currently break Bitcoin’s signatures. But any eventual transition would require coordination among developers, users and the companies that hold or move BTC, with difficult choices over whether migration should be voluntary and how to handle coins that remain unmoved.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many BTC are held in structurally vulnerable addresses?
Approximately 1.7 million BTC are held in older P2PK addresses, which expose their public keys on the blockchain. Address reuse can expose additional public keys.
Can a quantum computer break Bitcoin today?
No practical quantum computer capable of breaking Bitcoin’s signatures exists today. The risk described is theoretical.
Have BIP-360 or BIP-361 been approved?
No. As of November 2026, both proposals remain drafts and neither has an activation timeline.




